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Abstract 
I study a search-theoretic model with pairwise meetings where dealers arise endogenously. The 
extent of intermediation depends on its cost, trade frictions, and the dealers’ ability to negotiate favor-
able terms of trade. Under Nash bargaining, there is a unique equilibrium where dealers buy and hold 
the low-storage-cost good and, depending on their relative bargaining power, resell it at a premium or 
a discount. The distribution of the terms of trade is non-degenerate unless storage cost and frictions 
vanish. Due to an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if 
dealers can charge a positive markup. 
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1. Introduction 
I construct a search theoretic environment that allows endogenous determination of the number of 
trade facilitators and the negotiated terms of trade. In it, mediated exchange emerges as a natural re-
sponse to market frictions. I study how the incidence of intermediation responds to economic incen-
tives linked to frictions, intermediation costs, the availability of different goods, and the ability to ne-
gotiate favorable terms of trade.1 I also complement work on matching models of exchange, by point-
ing to the implications that the absence or the type of pricing mechanism have for existence and effi-
ciency of equilibria. I do so by proving existence of equilibria for a simple transaction pattern, of 
which I characterize the terms of trade, extent of intermediation, and study the efficiency properties. 
The economy is modeled in section 2, along the lines of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). This is a 
natural starting point because the model’s frictions make the role of intermediation explicit: certain 
agents choose to undertake the role of dealers, costly storing a commodity they don’t consume to re-
sell it to others. I relax the assumption of fixed terms of trade (as in Shi, 1995, and Trejos-Wright, 
1995), but also of exogenous distribution of agents specialized in each consumption-production activ-
ity (as in Wright, 1995). I study the fundamental transaction pattern, where some agents engage in a 
sequence of indirect trades involving only the lowest-storage-cost good. Several transaction patterns 
have been shown to exist in this class of models (e.g. Kehoe et al., 1993). I focus on the fundamental 
pattern for several reasons. To study the link between absence (or choice) of price mechanisms and 
existence of equilibria, I can restrict attention to a single trade pattern; investigating more than one 
provides little additional insight. Focusing on fundamental equilibria allows me to provide an espe-
cially clear illustration of the subject of interest by resolving an issue raised by Wright (1995). He 
proves the non-existence of fundamental equilibria when agents choose their specialty production, and 
the terms of trade are fixed at par. In fact, I prove existence of a continuum of ‘prices’ consistent with 
a fundamental strategy. Finally, the fundamental strategy is often considered the most “natural” when 
trade requires costly storage of goods. This has been suggested by studies of similar synthetic and ex-
perimental economies (Marimon et al., 1990, Brown, 1996, Duffy and Ochs, 1999).2 
I develop the analysis in section 3, assuming that the negotiated terms of trade satisfy a Nash bar-
gaining protocol. In section 4, I prove that equilibria exist where dealers arise endogenously only if 
their bargaining position is not extreme. When dealers are weak bargainers, they may sell at a discount 
but charge a markup on their sales when they are strong negotiators. Impatient consumers are willing 
                                                     
1 A number of studies have focused on intermediation in bilateral search markets with fixed prices. Examples 
include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Yavas (1994), Li (1998) and Shevchenko (1999). 
2 In particular, Duffy and Ochs emphasize how subjects show a strong tendency to play fundamental strate-
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to pay a premium, and producers offer discounts, to someone capable of quickly satisfying their effec-
tive demand. This obtains even if search frictions vanish. I find that in equilibrium there is terms of 
trade dispersion, which, however, may disappear as frictions and intermediation costs vanish (as in 
Camera and Corbae, 1999). The extent of intermediation responds in an intuitive way to changes in 
fundamentals. For example, as storage costs fall, more dealers arise. I also show existence of a contin-
uum of terms of trades supporting the fundamental exchange pattern, for arbitrary price mechanisms. 
Due to a trading externality generated by intermediation, however, an equilibrium is efficient only if 
dealers can sell at a premium and buy at a discount. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Environment 
Consider a version of model A in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), with a unit mass of ex-ante identi-
cal agents. They can produce and consume one non-storable autarkic good, good 0, with net utility 
a≥0. At the beginning of life (only), agents can acquire a market production opportunity i∈N≡{1,2,3}, 
losing the ability to produce good 0. This allows the agent to specialize in the costly production of 
market good i, that she cannot consume and whose production requires consumption of some amount 
of market good i-1. Market production opportunities can be freely discarded to revert to autarkic pro-
duction. Let a producer of i+1 be identified as agent (of type) i. Consumption of qi units of good i gen-
erates instantaneous utility u(qi)>0 only to agent i (zero otherwise); u(q) is strictly increasing, concave, 
continuously differentiable, u(0)=0, and future utility is discounted by β∈(0,1). Production of qi+1 
generates disutility γqi+1. Anyone can store one unit of good i suffering disutility ci per period, 
0<c1≤c2≤c3. Storage and market production are mutually exclusive, and once good i is stored it must 
be traded as an indivisible unit. Assume u(qi)- γqi>0 increasing on qi∈(0,1], let q={q1,q2,q3}, and nor-
malize γ=u'(1). Autarkic producers stay out of the market. At each date market producers are paired 
randomly and anonymously. Objects stored and type are observable in a match, trading histories are 
private information and agents cannot commit themselves to future actions. If two matched agents 
agree to trade, they bargain over the terms of trade. Production and consumption occur at the begin-
ning of the following period. Let Ui=u(qi)- γqi+1 denote the net instantaneous utility derived by agent i, 
if she produces qi+1 in exchange for qi.
3 
                                                                                                                                                                      
gies (over others) irrespective of marketability conditions in the experimental economy. 
3 Some of these features are extreme but make the model simple enough to generate clear results without 
sacrificing the rigorousness of the analysis. In particular, preferences and technologies motivate the existence of 
gains from specialization and trade, while storage bound and indivisibility limit the state space (see the difficul-
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3. Stationary Symmetric Fundamental Equilibrium 
Consider outcomes with no autarkic production where agents only accept own consumption or the 
lowest storage-cost good.4 I focus on stationary symmetric rational expectations equilibria where 
agents adopt Nash strategies. The terms of trade are reached via bilateral negotiations assumed to sat-
isfy Nash bargaining. Strategies are based on the correct evaluation of the gains from trade and are 
chosen to maximize the expected lifetime utility from consumption. In equilibrium production and 
trading decisions are individually optimal, given the correctly perceived strategies of others and distri-
bution of objects, and are time-invariant and identical for individuals of identical type. 
3.1 The initial choice of productive activity 
Individuals initially simultaneously choose a production opportunity, taking as given the strategies 
of others. Each market production is chosen by someone if it is weakly preferred to autarky and to the 
remaining others. Because of the link between production and types, I interpret the choice of produc-
tion as a choice over types. Let p'i∈[0,1] denote the probability that, at the beginning of life, the aver-
age individual chooses to produce good i=0,1,..3, given the choices {pi} of all others. For any j≠i, p'i=1 
(∈[0,1]) if i is strictly (weakly) preferred to every j, and p'i=0 if there is some j that is strictly preferred 
to i. Define a search equilibrium as an outcome where market production is strictly preferred to au-
tarky, i.e. p0=0. Since there must be positive demand for every market commodity, it requires ex-ante 
indifference among all market production.5 Thus, let p={p1,p2,p3} and p2 =1−( p1+p3); 0< pi< 1 is the 
population proportion of agents i=1,2,3, who produce good i+1 and consume i. 
Agent i would never store own production, due to costs, and would consume good i as soon as 
possible, due to discounting (conditions are provided later). She could, however, choose to store good 
i+2 if this allows her to obtain good i more frequently or at better terms of trade. Thus, at every date 
agent i can be either a producer of i+1, or a dealer storing one good i+2.  Let pi,j denote the proportion 
of agents i who can offer some good j. Then 
∑
∈Nj
i,jp =1. (1) 
 Let Vi,j be agent i’s lifetime utility when she can offer good j, and Va be the autarkic lifetime util-
                                                                                                                                                                      
ties due to complex distributions of holdings in Camera and Corbae, 1999, or Shevchenko, 1999). 
4 No additional insight is obtained by considering equilibria where some choose autarky. 
5 Assume pi=0 for some market good i and pj >0 for j≠i. Then, autarky is at least weakly preferred to market 
production i+1, since market good i is not produced. A similar conclusion holds if pi=1 for some i. 
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ity. Let E(Vi)≡ ∑
∈Nj
i,ji,jVp be the expected lifetime utility of agent i, unconditional on her current inven-
tory. It may be interpreted as the ex-ante average utility for agent i, a function of the endogenous dis-
tribution of inventories {pi,j}. I say that an agent is ex-ante indifferent between becoming a type i or h 
when the two expected lifetime utilities, unconditional on inventory, are identical but larger than the 
value of autarky.6 In a search equilibrium agents must be indifferent across production types, when 
taking as given {p,π,q}, and must strictly prefer market production to autarky; i.e. for all i,h=1,2,3 
E(Vi)=E(Vh)>Va (2) 
 3.2 Trading Strategies and Distributions 
Focus on meetings that may lead to mutually beneficial exchange, between i and j∈{i-1,i+1}. 
With probability pj pj,h agent i meets agent j who offers good h. They choose to trade taking as given 
q. In a rational expectations equilibrium choices are based on the correct forecast of the negotiated 
terms of trade (later discussed). Agent i in equilibrium always accepts to trade for good i, and refuses 
good i+1. What must be studied is whether she enters a trade in which she expects to produce qi+1 in 
exchange for one unit of good i+2 (modulo 3). Let πi'∈{0,1} denote the trading strategy of agent i 
when she takes as given the strategies π={π1,π2,π3} of all others, q, p and {pi,j}. Thus, π'i is the prob-
ability of accepting one unit of good i+2 in exchange for qi+1.
7 If the fundamental trading strategy is 
played agents i=1,3 only accept own consumption, while agent 2 accepts also one unit of good 1, i.e. 
π=π*≡{0, 1, 0}. Hence, when π* is an equilibrium 
pi,i=p1,3=p3,2=0<p1,2=p3,1=1 (3) 
for all i, while p2,3 and p2,1 are positive and must satisfy the steady-state law of motion 
p2,1p1p1,2=p2,3p3p3,1 
Its left hand side reflects how frequently agents 2 sell the intermediated good, and the right hand side 
how frequently they buy the intermediated good from its producers. Using the law of motion and (1) 
p2,1=
31
3
pp
p
+  and p2,3= 31
1
pp
p
+ . (4) 
 3.3 Value functions 
                                                     
6 While other measures are possible (for instance measuring expected utility conditional on type and current 
inventory) this measure is easy to work with, and it has been previously proposed (Wright, 1995). 
7 The focus on pure strategies is without loss in generality, due to divisible production. In equilibrium, agent 
i's partner (agent j) must want good i+1 (if j could produce it she would not accept it, and if j=i+2 she would not 
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Suppose there exists a search equilibrium where π=π* and (1)-(4) hold, for some q. Then, the sta-
tionary value function for agent i who can offer good j, must satisfy the standard equations 
V1,2=β{(p1+p3)V1,2+p2[p2,1max{U1+V1,2,V1,2}+p2,3
1'
max
π
{π'1(V1,3-γq2)+(1- π'1)V1,2}]} (5) 
 V2,1=−c1+β{p1max{u(q2)+V2,3,V2,1}+p2V2,1+p3V2,1} (6) 
 V2,3=β{p1V2,3+p2V2,3+p3
2'
max
π
[π'2(V2,1-γq3)+(1- π'2)V2,3]} (7) 
 V3,1=β{p1
3'
max
π
{π'3(V3,2-γq1)+(1- π'3)V3,1}+p2[p2,3max{U3+V3,1,V3,1}+p2,1V3,1]+p3V3,1} (8) 
Equation (5) describes the expected flow return to agent 1, as a producer. With probability p1+p3 she 
meets someone who does not trade with her, given the proposed π. With probability p2 p2,1 she meets a 
dealer who has one unit of her consumption good. If she chooses to trade, she expects to receive q1=1 
and to produce q2, with net utility U1 and continuation utility V1,2. With probability p2 p2,3 agent 1 
meets a type 2 who is a producer, and can choose to accept and store one unit of good 3 (π'1=1).8 Ex-
pressions (6)-(8) have a similar interpretation, and illustrate why the terms of trade may differ across 
matches. Agents 1 and 3 produce and consume simultaneously and never suffer storage costs. Agent 2, 
though, produces before consuming, and endures storage costs. Thus, the harder it is to sell her inven-
tory, the greatest is her burden. She can make these losses up by requesting discounts to producers of 
the intermediated good, q3<q1=1, or charging a premium to its consumers, q2>q1=1. 
3.4 Equilibrium Strategies and Negotiated Terms of Trade 
Individuals choose to trade only if they expect to obtain positive surplus. I say that, given π*, q is 
feasible if in equilibrium it leaves positive surplus to those who buy a consumption good. Specifically, 
feasibility requires Ui>0 for i=1,3 (which, in turn, implies V1,2, V3,1>0), i.e. 
q2< γ
)( 1qu  and q3> )( 1
1 qu γ−  (9) 
while in the case of agent 2 
u(q2)+V2,3-V2,1>0. (10) 
 Given q and π=π*, individual optimality of the trading strategy requires 
π'1=0    if  V1,2>V1,3−γq2      (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
offer good i+2). Thus, if i is indifferent to the trade, j could slightly reduce her request qi+1 to get the trade. 
8 Out of equilibrium actions must take into account the proposed q. For example when agent 1 considers this 
transaction, she expects to be required to produce q2 in exchange for one good 3. 
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 π'2=1    if  V2,3<V2,1−γq3       (12) 
 π'3=0    if  V3,1>V3,2−γq1.        (13) 
 Contingent on having chosen to trade with someone who can offer good j, producer i and her part-
ner bargain over the terms of trade, i.e. i's acquisition of Qj  in exchange for Qi+1. Due to storage re-
strictions, no dealer would request more than one unit to store. Thus, in a match between agents 2 and 
3, bargaining involves determination of a quantity Q3 to be produced by agent 2 in exchange for Q1=1. 
In a match between agent 1 and a dealer with Q1=1, bargaining involves determination of Q2 in ex-
change for the dealer's inventory. The negotiated terms of trade are assumed to satisfy the solution of a 
Nash bargaining problem with non-zero threat points and bargaining weight θ∈(0,1) to the dealer.9 
Given q and Q1=q1=1, {Q2,Q3} solves 
2Q
max [V2,3+u(Q2)-V2,1]
θ[u(1)-γQ2](1- θ) and 
3Q
max [V2,1−γQ3−V2,3]θ[u(Q3)-γ](1- θ) 
subject to (9)-(10) and (12), since surpluses must be positive; {Q2, Q3} satisfies Nash bargaining if 
u(Q2) + V2,3 − V2,1 = [u(1)- γQ2] γθ−
θ
)1(
)(' 2Qu   (14) 
 V2,1 − γQ3 − V2,3 = [u(Q3)- γ] )(')1( 3Quθ−
θγ   (15) 
The left hand sides show the trade surplus to the dealer. Her customer’s trade surplus is on the right 
hand side, ‘weighted’ by relative bargaining power, and the ratio of marginal utility from consumption 
to marginal cost of production. Note that by construction the total surplus in each match is maximized 
when trades occur at par, Q2=Q3=1, since u'(1)=γ.10 In a symmetric equilibrium (9)-(10), (12), and 
Q=q must also be satisfied. Since q1=1, then q2 is the real price offered by the dealer (the “ask” price) 
and q3 the real price paid by the dealer (the “bid” price) to, respectively, consumers and producers of 
the intermediated good. Thus, q2/q3 -1 can be taken to measure the real markup. 
A rational expectations symmetric stationary equilibrium is a set of value functions, strategies, dis-
tributions, and terms of trade, such that agents maximize expected lifetime utility, the distribution is 
stationary, and the terms of trade satisfy the assumed pricing rule, are feasible, and consistent with 
storing restrictions. That is, {Vi,j} satisfy (5)-(8), {p',π'}={p,π} satisfy (2) and (11)-(13), {pi,j} satisfy 
                                                     
9 While I do not model explicitly the bilateral bargaining process, this may be seen as implementing a solu-
tion to a more structured game (see for example Trejos and Wright, 1995). 
10 The two total surpluses are u(Q2)−γQ2 +u(1)−V2,1+V2,3 and u(Q3)−γQ3 +γ+V2,1−V2,3. 
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(3) and (4), and q=Q satisfies (9)-(10), q1=1, and (14)-(15). 
 
4. Existence and Characterization 
To prove existence of the fundamental equilibrium I check that, given {p,π,q}, (i) no agent prefers 
autarky, (ii) the strategy π* is individually optimal, and (iii) there is at least a fixed point 
{Q2,Q3}={q2,q3} to the map defined by (14)-(15), given q1=1. Requirement (i) is satisfied for a>0 suf-
ficiently small, which I henceforth assume. The strategy π* is individually optimal if (11)-(13) hold. 
Given a feasible q, the value functions associated to out-of-equilibrium actions, are 
V1,3={−c3+βp3[u(q1)+V1,2]}/[1-β(p1+p2)], 
when agent 1 has accepted (and now stores) one unit of commodity 3, and 
V3,2={−c2+βp2p2,3[u(q3)+V3,1]}/[1-β(p1+p2p2,1+p3)], 
when agent 3 has one unit of commodity 2. A lemma follows (all proofs in appendix). 
 
Lemma 1. Let π=π*. Given q, p, and {pij}, then π* is individually optimal iff 
c3>β(p3−p2p2,1)U1−γq2(1-β) (16) 
 c1<βp1u(q2)−γq3[1-β(1-p1)] (17) 
in which case (9) is sufficient for q to be feasible. 
 
Given q, dealers of good 1 can endogenously arise if the return to intermediation is sufficiently 
large. Two components affect it. One is the storage cost c1, that can’t be too large. The other is linked 
to the extent of trade frictions, captured by β, and the demand for the intermediated commodity, speci-
fied by p1. Great impatience and infrequent sales of intermediated goods (low β and p1) contribute to 
increase the expected length  of storage, hence raise the dealer's losses and reduce her expected utility 
from future consumption. Thus agent 2 would elect to not store good 1 if β or p1 are too low, even in 
the absence of storage costs. 
Given π=π*, stationary {pij}, and a feasible q,  I can now characterize the endogenous distribution 
p. Since all market commodities must be produced in a search equilibrium, I look for a mixed strategy 
p'=p=p*. The following lemma shows that p* is unique: in equilibrium every individual selects ex-ante 
to become type i with identical probability pi
*. 
 
Lemma 2. Let {pij} satisfy (3)-(4), π=π*, and q be feasible. There is a unique p* that satisfies (2), 
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where p1
*=
)( 321
11
UUU
cU
++β
+β , p3*=p1*
1
3
U
U , p2
*=1−( p1*+p3*), and pi*∈(0,1) ∀i. 
 
The initial choice of type is a function of storage cost and discount factor, but also of expected 
terms of trade and the transaction pattern. As storage costs grow the return to intermediation falls and 
indifference requires more frequent matches with consumers of the intermediated good. This decreases 
the duration of storage and increases the dealer's frequency of consumption. Thus, given q, p1
* and p3
* 
increase with c1, and  p2
* falls. Similar considerations apply to a decrease in β or q2: more impatience 
and less consumption make intermediation less attractive. Note that pi* converges to 1/3 for all i (as in 
Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) as c1→0, and only if all trades occur at par, qi=1 ∀i. The next lemma de-
scribes the properties of the equilibrium terms of trade, q*. 
 
Lemma 3. Let π=π*, and p=p*. If a feasible q* is a fixed point of (14)-(15), then it has the follow-
ing properties: (i) it cannot exist unless θ∈(θL,θH), 0<θL<θH<1, and if it exists it is unique; (ii) both 
q2
* and q3
* fall in c1 and rise in β, while q2* rises and q3* falls in θ; (iii) if θ∈(θM,θH) then q2*>q3* and 
q3*<1, θL<θM=1/3; (iv) trades occur at par if and only if θ=θM, c1→0, and β→1; (v) q2*/q3* increases 
in c1 and decreases in β if q3* is small, and the opposite occurs if q3* is large. 
 
Suppose q=q* is an equilibrium. A lower storage cost (or lower frictions) increases the return to a 
dealer. This creates stronger incentives for intermediation, p2 rises, and allows dealers to offer better 
terms of trade to producers, q3 rises. These factors spur production of good 1, p3 rises. The resulting 
fall in p1, however, lowers the dealer’s probability of consumption. She counteracts it by asking for 
more, q2 grows. The relative size of q2 and q3 depends on the bargaining powers. When the dealer’s 
bargaining position is weak, θL<θ≤θM, she might sell intermediated goods at a discount (if the storage 
cost is small) and may also be able to buy them at discount (if θ is not too low). When the dealer’s 
bargaining position is strong, θM<θ<θH, she always buys at a discount, q3<1, and sells at a premium, 
q2>q3. This results even if dealers have the weaker negotiating position (since θM=1/3) or if discount-
ing and storage costs are negligible. The markup charged responds in intuitive ways to changes in pa-
rameters. In particular, if dealers have been asking steep discounts to producers, q3 low, the markup is 
eased as frictions and costs fall (q2/q3 -1 falls). 
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If an equilibrium exists, it is generally characterized by terms of trade dispersion, due to heteroge-
neity in consumption frequencies. Since pi≠pj unless c1=0, the terms of trade need to adjust to support 
ex-ante indifference between economic activities. The total surplus is maximized in each match only if 
θ=θM, as frictions and intermediation cost vanish. In that case every transaction occurs at par. This is 
so because, when qi=1, p becomes a uniform distribution as c1→0, in which case dealers transact twice 
as frequently as anyone else. This provides a rationale for why the dealers’ relative bargaining power, 
θM/(1-θM), must be half that of their customers. Discounting must be negligible since dealers always 
produce prior to consumption. Conditions sufficient for existence of an equilibrium are next provided, 
using βL∈(0,1) and cH,cL>0 (functions of the model’s parameters). 
 
Proposition 1. Let a>0 small, c3>cL and θL<θ<θH. If βL<β<1 and c1<cH, then a unique search 
equilibrium {p*,π*,q*} exists. The equilibrium {p*,π*} is also supported by pricing mechanisms that 
generate terms of trade close to q*. 
 
The model illustrates why the absence of a pricing mechanism has consequences for existence of 
equilibria. When the distribution is endogenous, it is the inability of bargaining over better terms of 
trade that rules out the fundamental equilibrium (as in Wright, 1995). Indeed, when negotiations are 
allowed, there is a continuum of terms of trade that support it. Its existence depends also on the pricing 
mechanism adopted. For instance, take-it-or-leave-it offers, θ=0,1, cannot support it since surpluses 
from trade must be bounded away from zero. Under Nash bargaining and θ>θH, the dealer charges 
steep prices to her customers; thus, very few would choose to be one, p1,p3≈0. The opposite is true if 
θ<θL, when few would choose to be intermediaries, p2≈0. In both of these cases some agents either get 
very little surplus frequently or some surplus very infrequently. 
When is a decentralized allocation efficient? I answer the question by considering the outcome 
due to a planner who, taking as given the exchange arrangement, chooses the terms of trade to maxi-
mize social welfare W(q2,q3)=∑
=
3
1
32 )],([
i
ii qqVEp , i.e. the ex-ante expected utility of an agent.
11 
 
Proposition 2. Let {p*,π*} be an equilibrium. The welfare-maximizing q is such that q3<1<q2. 
                                                     
11 Thus, I am not asking whether the fundamental trading pattern is the best way to organize exchange. Stor-
age of other goods by other agents might increase the average consumption frequency and be welfare improving. 
 11
 
The planner would let dealers charge a markup because they provide a positive trade externality. 
Intermediation facilitates consumption through indirect trades. An insufficient number of dealers re-
duces the consumption frequency of some (the dealer’s customers), while an excessive number dimin-
ishes the dealers’ ability to consume. Dealers also economize on societal use of resources by holding 
the cheapest inventory. Thus, in general there is a ‘desirable’ interior intermediation level that gener-
ates maximum average lifetime utility, for the given pattern of exchange. To gain intuition, abstract 
from the cost saving aspect by letting c1>0 small, and consider β close to 1 and  θ=θM. Here the decen-
tralized equilibrium involves the exchange of the surplus-maximizing quantity qi=1, but there is un-
derprovision of intermediation, with agents (almost) equally distributed across economic tasks. The 
planner can raise the average frequency of consumption by inducing a greater number of dealers to 
arise through discounts on their inventory acquisitions and extra consumption on their purchases.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
I have illustrated a general equilibrium model with pairwise trades, where dealers arise endoge-
nously to mediate the sale of a good whose price is negotiated. I have done so by relaxing the assump-
tions of exogenous distribution and fixed prices in a prototypical search-theoretic model. I have 
proved existence of a unique equilibrium for a simple transaction pattern, when the negotiated terms of 
trade satisfy Nash bargaining. In equilibrium extent of intermediation and the terms of trade are fully 
flexible and respond in intuitive ways to changes in economic fundamentals. For example, more deal-
ers arise as their relative bargaining position strengthens or storage costs fall. The distribution of the 
terms of trade is non-degenerate, but trades may occur at par if frictions and storage costs vanish. I 
have shown that the choice of pricing mechanism has implications for efficiency of equilibria. Due to 
an externality created by intermediation, the efficient allocation can be achieved only if dealers are 
able to charge a markup. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. Use π=π* in (5)-(8) to rearrange the inequalities in (11) and (12) as (16) and 
(17), respectively; (13) is always satisfied. When q2<qH =u(1)/γ and q3>qL=u-1(γ) then (9) is satisfied, 
and (10) holds since U2>0 (true when π2=1). Thus, if π* is an equilibrium, q2<qH and q3>qL guarantee 
feasibility of q. Note that qH>1>qL>0 because of the assumptions made.■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let {pij} satisfy (3)-(4), π=π*, q2<qH, q3>qL, and a>0 small. Use (5)-(8)  in (2) 
for i=1,2,3. Then, V1,2−V3,1=0, if p3*=p1
1
3
U
U >0; V1,2−E[V2]=0 if p1*= )( 321
11
UUU
cU
++β
+β ∈(0,1), since 
U1>0 and c1<βU2 when π=π* (by Lemma 1). Thus, p2*=1−(p1*+p3*)∈(0,1) since p1*+p3*<1 if 
c1<
31
21
UU
UU
+
β , holding since (17) holds (seen by substituting p1* in it). It is obvious that p1*+p3*>0.■ 
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Proof of Lemma 3. Let a>0 small, π=π*, p=p*, given q. Q=q must be feasible, thus restrict atten-
tion to Q2<qH, Q3>q
L, Q1 =1. Q satisfies (14)-(15) if f(Q2,θ)=g(Q3,θ)=∆(Q2,Q3,c1)>0,where 
∆(·)≡V2,1−V2,3, f(·)≡u(Q2)−[u(1)- γQ2] γθ−
θ
)1(
)(' 2Qu , and g(·)≡γQ3+[u(Q3)- γ] )(')1( 3Quθ−
θγ ; fQ2 and gQ3 are 
positive (and equal only at Q3=Q2=1), gθ>0>fθ, f(Qi,θ)<g(Qi,θ)=∞ as Qi→∞, and 
f(Qi,θ)=−∞<g(Qi,θ)=0 as Qi→0. ∃ θH∈(0,1) such that f(qH,θ)>g(qL) only if θ<θH. Thus, a root 
Q2=h(Q3,θ) to f(Q2,θ)−g(Q3,θ)=0 exists only if θ<θH. The root is unique, and h is a strictly increasing, 
continuous and invertible function. If θ>θM=1/3 then f lays below g for all feasible Q3, i.e. 
qL<Q3< 3Q ≡h-1(qH), and are tangent at Q2=Q3=1 when θ=θM. If θ∈(θM, θH) then Q2=h(Q3,θ)>Q3 for 
all feasible Q3. If θ∈(0, θM) then Q2<Q3 if Q3 is close to 1, since f is concave in Q2. Finally, if 
Q2=h(Q3,θ) then Q2 increases and Q3 decreases in θ, since gθ>0>fθ, while U2≥0. 
Let θ<θH, Q3∈(qL, 3Q ), Q2=h(Q3,θ); ∆(Q3,θ,c1)= ( )[ ]
2
33211
1 p
QpQupc
β−
γ+β+−  positive if (17) holds. 
∃ θL∈(0,θM) such that ∆(Q3,θ,c1)≤g(Q3) if θ≤θL, since if θ=0 then ∆(·)−g(·)∝−c1−γQ3(1−β)<0. Thus 
let θL<θ<θH. Rewrite (17) as 
 c1<c1(Q3) ≡
31
321321 ))(1(
UU
UUUQUU
+
++β−γ−β   
where c1(Q3)>0 if β>β(Q3)≡ ( )( ) )(
)(
32331
32331
UUQQhuU
UUQQU
+γ+
+γ+γ , β(Q3)≤1 iff Q3≤ 3Q . Define cH=c1(qL) and 
βL=β(qL). If Q3= 3Q  (17) is violated ∀c1>0, which implies ∆( 3Q ,θ,c1)< γ 3Q <g( 3Q ,θ). If Q3=qL (17) 
is satisfied iff β∈(βL,1) and c1∈(0,cH), which implies ∆(qL,θ,c1)>γqL=g(qL) (since θ>θL). Let 
β∈(βL,1) and c1∈(0,cH). Since gQ3>0 and ∆( 3Q ,θ,c1)< g(Q3,θ)< ∆(qL,θ,c1), by the intermediate value 
theorem it follows that there exists a fixed point q3*∈(qL, 3Q ) such that g(q3*,θ)=∆(q3*,θ,c1). The 
fixed point is unique. If not, this would imply that d2∆(Q3,θ,c1)/dQ32 must switch sign at least twice as 
Q3 increases. This is not possible since it can be shown that the second partial in Q3 is monotone. 
Thus, let q*={1,h(q3*,θ),q3*}. Fix Q. ∆c1<0 since a maximum of d∆(Q3,θ,c1)/dc1 is proportional to 
−1+βp'1U2<0. Since g(Q3,θ) is independent of β and c1, then q3* (and q2*) fall in c1. ∆β>0 hence q3* 
(and q2*) increase in β. 
Let θ∈(θM, θH). I show q3*<1 by letting c1=0 and β=1, since q3* falls in c1 and rises in β. Suppose 
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Q3=1<Q2=h(1). Then ∆(1,θ,0)−g(1,θ) is  p1u(Q2)+p3γ+p2[γ+U3θ/(1-θ)]−γ−U3θ/(1-θ)<0, since the least 
stringent case is Q2=1 rearranged as θ/(1-θ)>1/2 (holding since θ>θM). Hence, ∆(Q3,θ,0)<g(Q3,θ) 
when Q3=1. Since gQ3>0 and gθ>0 then q3
*<1, and q2*>q3* even if β→1 and c1→0. Now let θ=θM, 
c1>0 and β<1: Q2=h(1)=1 since f(1,θM)=g(1,θM). Then, ∆(1,θM,c1)=g(1,θM) is −2c1= [u(1)+γ](1−β), 
satisfied only in the limit, as c1→0 and β→1. 
In equilibrium f(Q2,θ)-g(Q3,θ)=0, a constant. Taking its total differential it’s easy to see that 
dQ2/dQ3>0 for all  θ∈(θL, θH), dQ2/dQ3<1 if Q3 is sufficiently close to qL, and dQ2/dQ3>1 if Q3 is 
sufficiently close to 3Q . Since d(Q2/Q3)/dQ3=d(Q2/Q3)Q3−Q2, we conclude that Q2/Q3 is increasing 
in c1 and decreasing in β, if Q3 is sufficiently close to qL.  
 
Proof Proposition1. Let p=p*, q=q*; (16) is satisfied if c3>cL≡u(1)−γh(qL). Using lemmas 1-3, π* is 
an equilibrium for a>0 small, by continuity. Since (16)-(17) are strict inequalities, there are q in a 
neighborhood of q* capable of supporting {p*,π*}, generated by arbitrary pricing mechanisms.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. In equilibrium W(q3,q2)=E[Vi(q3,q2)]=E[Vj(q3,q2)] ∀i≠j, hence let W(·) be 
given by E[V1(q3,q2)]≡V1,2(q3,q2)= β−
β
1
3U (
31
1
UU
U
+ −p1). Note that W(qL,q2)=0≥W(q3, qH); U3 is con-
cave in q3 with maximum at q3=1; p1 is convex in q3 with minimum at q3=1 but it decreases in q2; 
U1/(U1+U3) falls in q2 and q3. Thus, there is an interior maximum W(q3,q2)>W(1,1). It is easy to verify 
that W(q3,q2) falls in q3 and rises in q2, when q3=q2=1. Thus, q2>1>q3 maximizes W(q3,q2).■ 
